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ExTRADrrioN OF A JUVENILE DE-

The state of Georgia, by an acting justice of peace of a county,
charged a thirteen-year-old boy with the crime of assault with intent to murder.
Under the Georgia Criminal Code the offense was punishable by imprisonment
in the penitentiary for a term of two to ten years.1 The boy was found in the
state of New York, whereupon the governor of Georgia sent a requisition for
extradition to the governor of New York. The boy defendant brought a habeas
corpus proceeding in a New York court to obtain release from custody under
the extradition warrant. Held, the defendant could not be extradited as a "criminal," because he could be tried solely as a juvenile delinquent under the laws
of Georgia. 2 People 'V. Butts, (S. Ct. 1939) 14 N. Y. S. (2d) 881.
The federal extradition statute provides that a person may be extradited
upon proof that he is a fugitive from justice and that he is legally charged with
a crime in the demanding state.3 A person is legally charged with a crime when
the courts of the demanding state have jurisdiction to try him for the specific
offense. 4 In the principal case, the New York court refused to allow extradition
of the defendant on the ground that he was not legally charged with a crime
since the laws of Georgia permit him to be tried only as a juvenile delinquent.
Under the Georgia code the juvenile court has exclusive jurisdiction over every
child under sixteen who commits any act for which he could be prosecuted in a
criminal proceeding; and an adjudication by the juvenile court does not denominate the child a criminal.11 Therefore, it is true that under these two sections
LINQUENT -

1 Ga. Code (1933), § 26-1403: "An assault with intent to murder shall be
punished by imprisonment and labor in the penitentiary for not less than two years
nor more than Io years."
2 Ga. Code (1933), § 24-2401: "In counties having a population of 60,000 or
more, juvenile courts are created and established with original and exclusive jurisdiction
of all cases coming within the terms and provisions of this Chapter." Sec. 24-2402:
"This Chapter shall apply to every child under I 6 years of age (a) Who violates any
penal law or any municipal ordinance, or who commits any act or offense for which he
could be prosecuted in a method partaking of the nature of a criminal action or
proceeding••••" Sec. 24-2412: "No adjudication under the provisions of this Chapter
shall operate as a disqualification of the child for any office ••• and such child shall not
be denominated a criminal by reason of any such adjudication, nor shall such adjudication be denominated a conviction."
8 I Stat. L. 302 (1793), 18 U.S. C. (1934), § 662; Roberts v. Reilly, n6 U.S.
80, 6 S. Ct. 291 (1885); Hyatt v. Corkran, 188 U.S. 691, 23 S. Ct. 456 (1903).
4 Ex parte Morgan, (D. C. Ark. 1883) 20 F. 298; State ex rel. Myers v. Allen,
83 F'.la. 655, 92 So. 155 (1922); Matter of Strauss, 197 U. S. 324, 25 S. Ct. 535
(1905); 81 A. L. R. 552 (1932).
5 Ga. Code (1933), §§ 24-2401, 24-2402, 24-2412. Supra, note 2.
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of the code the juvenile court of Georgia does have jurisdiction over the
defendant, not as a criminal, but as a delinquent; and that in a juvenile court proceeding a delinquent is not charged with or tried for a crime.6 But the Juvenile
Act has been interpreted to recognize the exclusive jurisdiction of the superior
courts of Georgia to try persons under the age of sixteen for criminal offenses,
even though such an interpretation is contrary to the express words of the act, in
order to uphold its constitutionality.7 The constitution of the state of Georgia
declares that the superior court shall have exclusive jurisdiction over crimes for
which the offender is subject to confinement in the penitentiary.8 Therefore,
it follows that the superior court, which is a court of general criminal jurisdiction, also has jurisdiction over the boy, not as delinquent, but as a criminal. It
would seem that to say that the boy cannot be extradited because he is not legally
charged with a crime and can be tried only as a juvenile delinquent is to go
contrary to the provisions of the Juvenile Act, the constitution and the decisions
of the supreme court of the state of Georgia. It is not for the courts or the governor of the state requisitioned to decide whether the boy is to be treated. as a
delinquent or as a criminal but for the courts of the demanding state.9 Logically
it would seem that the boy should have been extradited upon the demand of
the governor of Georgia.
Felicia J. Hmiel
6 8 MINN. L. REv. 167 (1924); Cinque v. Boyd, 99 Conn. 70, 121 A. 678
(192.3); In re Powell, 6 Okla. Cr. 495, 120 P. 1022 (1912); Sylvester v. Commonwealth, 253 Mass. 244, 148 N. E. 449 (1925); Leonard v. Licker, 3 Ohio App. 377
(1914). These courts all say that the Juvenile Act is an assertion of the state's power
as parens patriae and its right to exercise proper parental control over minors and that

the main purpose of the act is to protect and save the child.
7 Ga. Code (1933), § 24-2416 provides that the "court may, in its discretion,
in any case of a delinquent child brought before it as herein provided, permit such
child to be proceeded against in accordance with the laws that may be in force governing
the commission of crime, and in such case the petition, if any, filed under this Chapter
shall be dismissed and the child shall be transferred to the court having jurisdiction of
the offense." Notwithstanding the words "in its discretion," the courts of Georgia have
interpreted the act as giving the discretion to decide how the child is to be tried
not to the juvenile courts but to the superior courts of Georgia. Hicks v. State, 146
Ga. 706, 92 S. E. 216 (1917); Thomas v. State, 174 Ga. 654, 163 S. E. 734 (1934);
Johnson v. State, 43 Ga. App. 474, 159 S.E. 295 (1931); Williams v. Davidson, 147
Ga. 491, 94 S. E. 564 (1917).
Other states also recognize that the juvenile court's jurisdiction does not deprive
the criminal courts of their jurisdiction over the child committing a crime. The Illinois
court in People v. Lattimore, 362 Ill. 206 at 209, 199 N. E. 275 (1935), said that
"It was not intended by the legislature that the juvenile court should be made a haven
of refuge where a delinquent child of the age recognized by law as capable of committing a crime should be immune from punishment for violation of the criminal
laws." Tipton v. Commonwealth, 221 Ky. 363, 298 S. W. 990 (1927); State v.
Tweed, 63 Utah 176, 224 P. 443 (1924).
8 Ga. Code (1933), § 2-3201: "The Superior Courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction ..• in criminal cases where the offender is subjected to loss of life, or confinement in the penitentiary.•.•"
9 Drew v. Thaw, 235 U. S. 432, 35 S. Ct. 137 (1914); State ex rel. Burnett v.
Flournoy, 136 La. 852, 67 So. 929 (1915).

